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Surgical innovation and ethical dilemmas: Precautions and proximity

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No! I am not Prince Hamlet, nor was meant to be;
Am an attendant lord, one that will do
To swell a progress, start a scene or two…

—T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock

Let me start by thanking the organizers for their invitation to be here and to start this off. I am not sure if that invitation was an act of kindness or of throwing a fellow bioethicist to the lions, as we will be addressing a complicated set of issues upon which well-intentioned folks disagree and sometimes disagree with a passion.

What I would like to do is to lay out some of the inherent ethical problems related to surgical innovation. I will argue that some of these problems are unique to surgery and that others relate to how we have chosen to define categories like research and practice. Other problems involve how we view the proportionality of risks and benefits in surgical research. I will argue that we have falsely analogized surgical progress to progress made in other areas of biomedical research and misunderstood the highly personal, or proximate, nature of surgical inquiry. Without appreciating the import of what I will call “surgical proximity,” we will be unable to adequately address ethical issues in surgical innovation.

PROBLEMS OR DILEMMAS?

So let me begin with the title of our session, “Surgical Innovation and Ethical Dilemmas,” and why this juxta position is counterproductive. A colleague long ago taught me to distinguish problems from dilemmas—the former being resolvable, the latter intractable, often involving a choice between two equally unfavorable choices.

Although I may be making too much of the semantics, I do think the title betrays a presumption that surgical innovation invariably forces adversarial choices. It tends to dichotomize ethical reflection, pitting those who favor prudence against those who endorse progress, or it creates too stark a difference between ethical issues in surgical practice and those encountered in the conduct of surgical research.

Even therapeutic, validated surgery in many ways has the potential to become innovative, if not outright experimental. Patients may have anatomical differences that require surgical improvisation, or complications may arise during “routine” surgery, creating the need for an imaginative response.1 At what point do these departures from expected care become novel interventions, innovative or even experimental? A routine case with an unexpected turn can even become a case report opening up a new field of endeavor.

For instance, the field of stereotactic functional neurosurgery was born out of a “routine” case of ablative surgery for Parkinson’s disease in the 1980s, when the French neurosurgeon Alim Benabid was using electrodes to determine which areas of the brain should be destroyed. As he was mapping the thalamus, he noted that the tremor of his patient abated. This led him to wonder if one could treat drug-resistant Parkinson’s with electrical stimulation instead of destructive lesioning.2 Benabid’s translational insight during an ordinary case led to the development of the rather extraordinary field of stereotactic functional neurosurgery and neuromodulation.3,4

Another example from an earlier era comes from the life work of neurosurgeon Wilder Penfield, who did pioneering work in the surgical treatment of epilepsy. Here, the accumulation of experience from “routine care” led to generalizable knowledge, much like hypotheses are validated in experimental work. In Penfield’s case, his clinical use of electrical stimulation to plan resections of scar tissue causing epilepsy led him to map the human homunculus, a magnificent achievement of profound importance.5,6

So let us avoid simplistic and confounding demarcations. Instead of dichotomizing innovation and prudence—or surgical research and surgical practice—let us try to start our deliberations with an eye toward a more synthetic approach. Like most things in nature and in biology, ethics too is on a continuum with gradations that can fit into an Aristotelian taxonomy. Let us emulate what Aristotle called phronesis, or practical wisdom, these next 2 days so that we achieve constructive outcomes, or what the pragmatists would call instrumental goods.7

If we are successful in laying out the ethical issues in this clinically pragmatic fashion, we can turn intractable “dilemmas” into problems amenable to resolution through the particularistic invocation of ethical principles as they relate to the surgical context.8 If we follow this inductive method of moral problem solving, we will avoid sweeping ethical generalizations, or categoricals, that can misrepresent the complexity of innovative research and deprive society of its benefits.9